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 Dirk Kohnert 
On the Renaissance of African Modes of Thought: 
The Example of Occult Belief Systems  
Zusammenfassung  
Die Analyse okkulter Glaubenssysteme in Afrika stellt eine einzigartige Möglich-
keit dar, zu zeigen, dass angeblich rückständige afrikanische Denkweisen wie der 
Magie- und Hexenglaube höchst modern sind und erheblichen Einfluss auf die Ge-
sellschafts- und Wirtschaftsstrukturen der betroffenen Völker haben. Offizielle 
Ansätze zur Bewältigung der durch Hexenanklagen bedingten gewaltsamen Kon-
flikte bauen seit der Kolonialzeit auf eine durch eurozentrische Sichtweisen ge-
prägte Kolonialgesetzgebung auf, die, legitimiert durch eine vorurteilsgeladene 
westlich geprägte Sozialwissenschaft, zum Bestandteil des Problems selbst wurde. 
Afrikanische Religionen bieten Ansätze für die Fortentwicklung tragfähigerer 
eigenständiger Lösungsansätze. Darüber hinaus können sie unter bestimmten Be-
dingungen auch westlichen Kulturbereichen neue, innovative Dimensionen philo-
sophischen Denkens und emanzipativen Handelns bieten, zum Beispiel im Bereich 
der gesellschaftlichen Konfliktlösung und Versöhnung. Afrikanische Lösungs-
ansätze für die Gewaltanwendung im Rahmen von Hexenanklagen greifen aller-
dings nur, insoweit sie gegen negative Einflüsse einer globalisierten liberal-
kapitalistischen Wirtschaftsordnung geschützt werden können. 
Abstract  
The analysis of African occult belief systems provides a unique example for de-
monstrating that seemingly outdated and exotic African modes of thought, such as 
the belief in magic and witchcraft, are modern and have significant impact on so-
cial, economic and political structures. Official approaches, designed to cope with 
the problems of witchcraft violence in Africa, have since the advent of colonial 
rule been based on eurocentric views and colonial jurisdiction, legitimised by 
Western social science. These answers are inadequate; in fact, they constitute part 
of the problem itself. African religions could provide a framework for valuable in-
digenous solutions to actual problems of contemporary life, including the problem 
of witchcraft violence. Besides, they might, under certain conditions, provide the 
outside world with an inspiring new dimension of philosophic thought and eman-
cipative action, for example, within the realm of conflict resolution and recon-
ciliation. However, even in the case of the ‘domestication’ of witchcraft violence, 
this holds only in so far as appropriate African answers can be shielded against the 
negative impact of globalised liberal capitalism. 
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Modernity and African Renaissance: divided between rationalism 
and superstition 
The history of African philosophies and development visions, from Nkrumah’s Panafri-
canism via Senghor’s Négritude to the current concepts of the New Partnership for Af-
rica’s Development (NEPAD)1 and the related vision of an African Renaissance, is said 
to be a history of failures.2 Certainly, the proponents of African Renaissance suggest 
that Africans are successfully continuing to rise out of slavery, colonialism, and neo-
colonialism into liberation. Their vision is based on the rich intellectual and cultural 
heritage of Africa and the common dream of its renaissance.3 Unfortunately, implemen-
tation of these concepts has so far been primarily restricted to myth-making, used by the 
new African elite as a mobilisation tool to unite their people in the fight against neo-
colonialism, or even as an ideological political tool in the pursuit of particular class in-
terests.4  
„21st century Africa will be rational, or it will not be at all“5 wrote the Cameroonian 
sociologist Axelle Kabou (1991) in her provocative bestseller more than a decade ago. 
This was by no means a reflection limited to the eurocentric modernisation ideology of 
the former colonial masters; it has been the prevailing view of both the European edu-
cated African power elite and the donor community who have been involved in Africa 
up to the present day. The globalisation of universal standards of governance and of 
neo-liberal economic concepts corresponding to Western standards was promoted, last 
but not least, by the political conditions imposed by the international donor community. 
Nevertheless, this was readily accepted by African rulers, as reflected in the NEPAD 
                              
1 New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD); cf. www.nepad.org; 10.03.05. For an evalua-
tion of NEPAD cf. Henning MELBER: The G8 and NEPAD – More than an elite pact? Institut für 
Afrikanistik, ULPA - University of Leipzig Papers on Africa. Politics and Economics 2004, p. 74. 
Sally MATTHEWS: Investigating NEPAD’s development assumptions, in: Review of African Politi-
cal Economy Vol. 31, Nr. 101 (September 2004), pp. 497-511. 
2 Cord JAKOBEIT: Afrikanische Diskussionen zur Entwicklung des Kontinents – das Beispiel ‚Afri-
can Renaissance’, in: Journal für Entwicklungspolitik, Vol. 2 (2000), pp. 149-160. Axelle KABOU: 
„Et si l'Afrique refusait le développement“?, Paris 1991. MELBER: The G8, p. 74. 
3 Mbulelo Vizikhungo MZAMANE: Where there is no vision the people parish: Reflections on the 
African Renaissance. Hawke Institute Working Paper Series, No 16; Hawke Institute, University of 
South Australia, Magill, South Australia 2001, (available online: http://www.unisa.edu.au/hawke/ 
institute/resources/working%20paper%2016%20(Mbulelo).pdf; 26.01.05. Ulrich LÖLKE: Zwischen 
Altem und Neuem – Afrikanische Renaissance und die Geschichte afrikanischer Einheit. Epd-Ent-
wicklungspolitik, Vol. 10 (2003), pp. 32-34. For an annotated detailed bibliography on the defini-
tion and concept of African Renaissance cf. Anne JANSEN / Claudia ROESKE: African Renaissance 
– Annotated online bibliography (in German), DÜI, Hamburg, 2001, <www.duei.de/dok/archiv/ 
onlinebibl_afdok_01_3.pdf>; 20.01.2005; as well as online bibliographies, like <www.africavenir. 
com/elibrary/african-renaissance/index.php>; 26.01.05. African Renaissance Bibliography: <www. 
fu-berlin.de/afrosi/documents_pdf/AfricanRenaissanceBibliography.pdf>; 26.01.2005. 
4 Ian LIEBENBERG: The African Renaissance: Myth, Vital Lie, or Mobilising Tool? African Security 
Review, Vol 7, No. 3 (1998): available online: http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/7No3/Liebenberg. 
html; 26.01.05. 
5 «L’Afrique du XXIe siècle sera rationnelle ou ne sera pas», cf KABOU: „Et si l'Afrique refusait le 
développement“. 
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programme.6 The (post) modernisation ideology contributed to the questioning of Afri-
can local custom and of indigenous knowledge as outdated barriers to development. It 
was commonly assumed that modernisation would inevitably rationalise both social pro-
cesses and human beliefs. This also holds for „traditional” African religions, and par-
ticularly for the occult belief, i.e. the belief in magic and witchcraft7, characterised by 
modernists as superstition.  
The proponents of modernisation in Africa and elsewhere would like to uproot this 
belief as soon as possible in the name of progress, preferably by legal means and educa-
tional campaigns (cf. below). To date, the cultural heritage of African societies is still 
unjustly seen by the majority of experts merely in terms of development constraints, 
dominated by characteristics such as rent seeking, informal sector trap, irrational eco-
nomic actors or the prebend economy8, without due regard to its historical roots and its 
dependency on the global economic system, as explained by Bilgin / Morton9, Comaroff / 
Comaroff10, Mazrui11 and others.12 However, apparently there coexist multiple moderni-
                              
6 cf. MELBER: G8. MATTHEWS: Investigating NEPAD’s development, pp. 497-511. 
7 African scholars, religious leaders and healers, as well as politicians, maintain that they, with other 
Africans, share a common ground of ‘basics’ of occult belief, i.e. that witchcraft is a reality and 
principally evil; it is to be considered as an integral part of African culture. Therefore, analytical 
concepts of witchcraft should take this emic view on the subject into account: cf. Dirk KOHNERT: 
Witchcraft and transnational social spaces: witchcraft violence, reconciliation and development in 
South Africa’s transition process. Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 41, Nr. 2 (2003), pp. 
217-245. For a detailed discussion of definitions and concepts of witchcraft, sorcery and magic in 
different local contexts, as well as of the limitations and fallacies of the general delimitations of 
witchcraft, particularly in the African context, and finally on the ambiguities of the transfer of euro-
centric concepts of magic and witchcraft to African societies, cf. Peter GESCHIERE: „The modernity 
of witchcraft. Politics and the occult in postcolonial Africa“, London 1997, pp. 12-15, 215-224. 
Dirk KOHNERT: Magic and witchkraft: implications for democratization and poverty alleviating aid 
in Afrika. World Development, Vol. 24 (1996), pp. 1347-1355. 
8  Patrick CHABAL / Jean Pascal DALOZ: Africa works. Disorder as political instrument, Oxford 1999. 
Ulrich MEZEL: Afrika oder – das neue Mittelalter – Eigenlogik und Konsequenzen der Gewaltöko-
nomie, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 9 (2003), S. 1060-1069. For examples of 
dubious oversimplifications of the role of African culture as an impediment to modern economic 
development cf. Lawrence HARRISON / Samuel P. HUNTINGTON (eds.): Culture matters: how val-
ues shape human progress, New York 2000, p. xiii; on Ghana and its harsh critique by Amartya 
SEN: How does culture matter? Paper, Conference on Culture and Public Action, World Bank, 
Washington D. C., April 2002, pp. 10-11. CHABAL / DELOZ: Africa, pp. 128-30. 
9 Pinar BILGIN / Adam DAVID: Historicising representations of ‘failed states’: beyond the cold-war 
annexation of the social sciences?, in: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, Nr. 1 (2002), pp. 55-80, pp. 
73-75. 
10 Jean COMAROFF / John COMAROFF: Transparent Fictions, or the Conspiracies of a Liberal Imagina-
tion – An Afterword, in: H. G. WEST / T. SANDERS (eds.), Transparency and conspiracy: ethno-
graphies of suspicion in the New World Order, Durham, NC 2003, pp. 287-300. 
11 Ali A. MAZRUI: The African Renaissance – A Triple Legacy of Skills, Values and Gender. First pre-
sented as the Keynote Address at the 5th General Conference of The African Academy of Sciences, 
held in Hammamet, Tunisia, April 22-27, 1999; <www.africacentre.org.uk/renaissance.htm#Ali% 
20A.%20Mazrui>; 20.01.2005. 
12 For a critique of the lack of regard for the pluralism of African cultures, of ethnocentrism and of the 
ideological facets of ethno-philosophy, cf. Paulin J. HOUNTONDJI: „African Cultures and Globalisa-
tion. A Call to Resistance. D+C Development and Cooperation, No. 6 (November/December 1997), 
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ties – including the modernity of occult belief systems – in Africa, each of which follows 
its own cultural traits.13 Therefore, what would be required is both the emancipation of 
awkward aspects of witchcraft violence and the liberation from the Procrustes' bed of an 
individualistic and uncritical scientific Western tradition of Cartesian reason. As Jürgen 
Habermas14 explained some twenty years ago, the European tradition of enlightenment 
is an „unfinished business”. This is particularly the case when it is articulated in the 
form of technological reason, which often acts to support the concerns of dominant 
vested interests, shielded behind the supposed objectivity of rational actors. In fact, this 
specific culturally bound logic in itself constitutes a new form of superstition. 
This has serious repercussions on both research and development politics. The reali-
ties of local politics and economics, notably the linkage between religious thought and 
political practice in Africa,15 remained until recently neglected by the mainstream of 
academic research. This is particularly the case for economics and political science, but 
also for policy advisors and development experts, who base their analyses on eurocen-
tric assumptions. The modernity and relevance of occult belief had crucial, hitherto un-
noticed implications on shifting legitimacy and power relations at the local level of Af-
rican societies. Representatives of the state, party leaders, political entrepreneurs, war-
lords, and civil society organisations contested the established power brokers, such as 
traditional rulers, healers or religious leaders, who were now competing strategic play-
ers in the local political arena.16 
                                                                                                                                                
pp. 24-26. IDEM: Tempting traditions – Internal debate needed in traditional cultures, in Compas 
Magazine (March 2001), pp. 12-13. Jean-Marc ELA: Les voies de l’afro-renaissance – Refus du dé-
veloppement ou échec de l’occidentalisation? Le Monde diplomatique, (Octobre 1998), p. 3 ana-
lysed the wealth and dynamics of indigenous social innovations in sub-Saharan Africa at the grass-
root level; he engaged in a passionate call for a new approach, in considering rural life in Africa 
with its enormous potential of creativity as a laboratory of social change with often surprising and 
highly competitive results, promising an African renaissance. – The growing awareness of the im-
portance of cultural change for African development is also reflected in development policy: On 20 
June 2003, the ministers of culture of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, on their 
first meeting in Dakar (Senegal), adopted the Dakar Plan of Action to start an innovative approach 
with culture as a driving force for development; cf. The Courier ACP-EU, No. 199, July 2003, pp. 
8-9 and <www.acpse.org>; 10.03.05. 
13 cf. the ongoing debate on „African modernities”, Jan-Georg DEUTSCH / Peter PROBST / Heike 
SCHMIDT (Hg.): African modernities – entangled meanings in a current debate, Portsmouth 2002, 
and on „multiple modernities” cf. Ibrahim KAYA: Modernity, openness, interpretation – A perspec-
tive on multiple modernities. Social Science Information, Vol. 43, Nr. 1 (2004), pp. 35-57. Arif 
DIRLIK: Global modernity? Modernity in an age of global capitalism, in: European Journal of So-
cial Theory, Vol 6, Nr. 3 (2003), pp. 275-292. 
14 Jürgen HABERMAS: The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1987. 
15 cf. Stephen ELLIS / Gerrie TER HAAR (eds.): Worlds of power – Religious thought and political 
practice in Africa, London 2004. Gordon MITCHELL / Eve MULLEN (eds.): Religion and the politi-
cal imagination in a changing South Africa, Münster 2002. John COMAROFF: Governmentality, ma-
teriality, legality, modernity – On the colonial state in Africa, in: DEUTSCH / PROBST / SCHMIDT 
(Hg.), African modernities, pp. 107-134. V. FAURE (ed.): Dynamiques religieuses en Afrique aus-
trale, Paris 2000. Jean-François BAYART (ed.): Religion et modernité politique en Afrique noire. 
Dieu pour tous et chacun pour soi. Paris 1993. 
16 cf. ELLIS / TER HAAR (eds.): Worlds of power. GESCHIERE: The Modernity of Witchcraft. Politics 
and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa, Charlottesville/London 1997. Thomas BIERSCHENK: Powers 
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In contrast to the post-modernist approach, contemporary African philosophers and 
sociologists maintained that far from rejecting development and rationalism in itself, 
„Africa is forging new trails towards the affirmation of its dignity”.17 But it would seem 
that the African quest for its own distinguished way of development has a long way to 
go. In the short run, the rapid rise of globalised neo-liberal capitalism, accompanied by 
the hyper-rationalisation of economic and social relationships on the one hand, and its 
aftermath of increasing social differentiation on a global scale on the other, simultane-
ously led to an unprecedented growth of occult belief systems and economies in Africa 
and elsewhere, as described in detail by the Comaroffs and others.18 This had a negative 
impact on development, including gross violation on an unprecedented scale of human 
rights by witchcraft violence and instrumentalised ritual (muti) murder in various Afri-
can countries.19  
Surprisingly, in the emic world view, the major fault lines, created under the impact 
of globalisation, did not lead to a reinforcement of accusations against external enemies, 
as under the rule of colonialism or racism in South Africa. Rather, they materialised in 
growing confrontation with the alleged enemy within one’s own society, village or peer 
group. In South Africa for example, the major lines of conflict of the apartheid regime 
between race and class, were replaced during the transition period by cleavages between 
different age-groups or generations, mediated by gender.20 Black male underclass youth 
and ANC activists tried to translate their understanding of Western ideas of democrati-
sation and socialism in specific actions to eradicate the evil, equated with black magic, 
by witchcraft accusations against certain elders, preferably deviant elderly women, 
whom they saw as a menace to their communities.21 In the following paper I should like 
                                                                                                                                                
in the Village. Rural Benin between Democratisation and Decentralisation. In: Africa, Vol. 73, Nr. 
2 (2003), pp 145-173. IDEM.: The local appropriation of democracy. An analysis of the municipal 
elections in Parakou, Rep. Benin 2002/03. Working Papers of the Department of Anthropology and 
African Studies, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, 2004, Nr. 39. 
17 Célestin MONGA: Anthropologie de la colère: Société civile et démocratie en Afrique Noire., Paris 
1994. HOUNTONDJI: African Culture. DERS: African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (First published 
1977, Sur la Philosophie Africaine), Indiana University Press 1996. 
18 cf. Jean COMAROFF / John COMAROFF: Occult economies and the violence of abstraction: Notes 
from the South African postcolony, in: American Ethnologist, Vol. 26, Nr. 2 (1999), pp. 279-303. 
IDEM.: Alien-Nation: Zombies, immigrants, and millennial capitalism. CODESRIA Bulletin, Nr. 
3-4 (1999), pp. 17-27. IDEM.: Privatizing the Millennium: New Protestant Ethics and the Spirits of 
Capitalism in Africa, and Elsewhere. In: Afrika spectrum, Vol. 35 (2001) Nr. 3, pp. 293-312. ELLIS 
/ TER HAAR: Worlds of power. Isac NIEHAUS: Witchcraft, power and politics – Exploring the occult 
in the South African, London 2001. 
19 cf. ELLIS / TER HAAR: Worlds of power. J. EVANS: On brûle bien les sorcières – Les meutres muti 
et leur repression. In: Politique Africaine, Vol. 48 (1992), pp. 47-57. KOHNERT: Witchcraft. K. 
PELTZER / P. MAKGOSHING: Attitudes and beliefs of police officers towards witchcraft (boloi) and 
their intervention role in the Northern Province, South Africa. In: Acta Criminologica, Vol. 14 
(2001), Nr. 2, pp. 100-107. 
20 COMAROFF / COMAROFF: Occult economies. 
21 cf. I. KESSEL: From Confusion to Lusaka: the Youth revolt in Sekhukhuneland. In: Journal of 
Southern African Studies, Vol. 19, Nr 4 (1993), pp. 593-614. A. ASHFORT: Witchcraft, violence, 
and democracy in the new South Africa. In: Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, Vol. 38 (1998), pp. 505-
532. EVANS: On brûle bien les sorcières. FAURE (ed.): Dynamiques religieuses. Anthony MINNAAR: 
Witch purging in the Northern Province of South Africa: A victim profile and assessment of initia-
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to substantiate two hypotheses: Firstly, the analysis of African occult belief systems 
provides a unique example for demonstrating that seemingly outdated and exotic Afri-
can modes of thought, such as the belief in magic and witchcraft, are „modern”, i.e. not 
only current and widespread, affecting relevant aspects of everyday life in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but they also have significant impact on actual social, economic and political 
structures. Although often ill-adapted to the actual human environment of the stake-
holders, occult belief systems in African societies reflect a cultural process which is not 
at all limited to remote places in the hinterland, but is based on African traditional relig-
ions and shaped by current linkages between transnational social spaces in a globalised 
world, as Geschiere22 and others have demonstrated.23 Secondly, African religious sys-
tems provided a framework for valuable indigenous solutions to current problems of 
contemporary life, for example within the realm of increasing violence of non-state ac-
tors, including the problem of witchcraft violence. Besides, under certain conditions, 
they might provide the outside world with an inspiring new dimension of philosophic 
thought and emancipative action, for example, within the realm of conflict resolution 
and reconciliation. However, even as regards the ‘domestication’ of witchcraft violence, 
this holds only if appropriate African answers can be shielded against negative impacts 
of globalised capitalism.  
On the relevance of the political economy of African belief in magic 
and witchcraft 
1. The political economy of occult belief systems is neither outdated 
nor exotic  
The belief in magic and witchcraft is deeply ingrained in African society. It exerts a de-
cisive structuring influence on everyday life, even in the informal sector of politics and 
economics. Occult belief systems in Africa have since pre-colonial times been continu-
ally adapted to the current needs of their stakeholders. Last, but not least, they are indi-
cators of a growing alienation caused by individualisation processes and triggered by 
globalisation and subsequent social, economic and political transformations. 
Contrary to a widely held view in economics and political science, the political eco-
nomy of the belief in magic and witchcraft in Africa is neither outdated nor restricted to 
exotic fields of study of somewhat limited societal interest and which are occupied by 
traditionally minded anthropologists. In the past decade, the modernity of the belief in 
magic and witchcraft and its relevance for the everyday life of Africans has been proven 
by a vast body of cultural studies and scholarly analyses, based on innumerable case 
studies, summarised and conceptualised by internationally renowned scholars, such as 
                                                                                                                                                
tive to deal with witchcraft. Unpublished paper, delivered to witchcraft summit, 28 September 
1999, Giyani, mpd. J. MIHALIK / Y. CASSIM: Ritual murder and witchcraft: A political weapon. In: 
South Africa Law Journal, (1992), pp. 127-140. I.A. NIEHAUS: The ANC’s dilemma: the symbolic 
politics of three witch-hunts in the South African lowveld, 1990-1995, in: African Studies Review 
41, 3 (1998), pp. 93-118. NIEHAUS: Witchcraft, power and politics. 
22 GESCHIERE: The modernity of witchcraft. 
23 KOHNERT: Witchcraft. 
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Geschiere24, Ellis25, the Comaroffs26 and others. It is not by chance that the connection 
between globalised capitalism and occult economics within the framework of economic 
and political transformation processes in Sub-Saharan Africa, which took place in the 
wake of the second wind of change in the 1990s, reminds one of an amazing resurgence 
and manifestation of Marxist concepts of alienation (Entfremdung, Entäußerung), ob-
jectification (Vergegenständlichung), and commodity fetishism in the spiritual African 
world.27 During the transition period in South Africa, for example, the growing alien-
ation of producers from the logic of the globalised economy led to people imagining the 
existence of migrant labourers, bewitched as zombies and employed by powerful entre-
preneurs and witches in pursuit of their sinister and selfish interests.28 Strikingly similar 
notions of zombies employed by witches were reported, according to Geschiere29, from 
Cameroon, southern Ghana, eastern Nigeria, former Zaire and Sierra Leone.  
In Ghana, Nigeria, and other African countries, faithful new-born Christians looked 
for comfort and spiritual protection from the diabolic powers of the world market. Quite 
worldly problems, such as diminishing terms of trade, falling farmgate prices of local 
export crops, increasing unemployment, and indebtedness were explained within the 
context of their religion. New charismatic churches offered ready assistance to cope with 
these problems. Pentecostals in Ghana for example, revealed the dangers inherent in 
foreign commodities and offered to remove the spell from the fruits of globalisation. As 
they understood it, any foreign goods imported from the world market and sold in the 
local markets of Accra or Kumasi could be infected with evil. However, unlike historical 
materialism, they did not relate the assumed evil powers of these commodities to alie-
nated relations of production. Instead, they identified this evil as a direct materialisation 
of demonic forces, as a true and real fetish which requires a ritual of „de-fetishisation”, 
before being suited and safe for local consumption.30  
Another vivid example of the alienation of the ethics of African traditional religions 
and of the systems of checks and balances within the realm of informal politics which 
are connected with it, is the transformation of secret cults, and the politics of vigilance 
and ritual murder in Nigeria.31 The police raid in August 2004 on the Okija-shrine, in 
                              
24 GESCHIERE: The modernity of witchcraft. 
25 ELLIS / TER HAAR: Worlds of power. 
26 COMAROFF / COMAROFF: Occult economies. IDEM.: Alien-Nation. 
27 For a succinct description of the theory of alienation and related concepts cf. „Alienation in Hegel 
and Marx”, in: The Dictionary of History of Ideas, Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas, edited by 
Philip P. WIENER, published by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, in 1973-74. <cf. http://etext. 
lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-06>, 25.02.05. 
28 COMAROFF / COMAROFF: Occult economies. 
29 GESCHIERE: The modernity of witchcraft, pp. 147-51, 165, 254. 
30 cf. E. KAMPHAUSEN: Pentecostalism and De-Fetishism. A Ghanaian Case Study, in: Journal of Con-
structive Theology, Vol. 6, Nr. 1 (2000), pp. 79-96. Birgit MEYER: The power of money. Politics, 
occult forces and Pentecostalism in Ghana, in: The African Studies Review, Vol. 41, Nr. 3 (1998), 
pp. 15-37. 
31 cf. Johannes HARNISCHFEGER: Witchcraft and the state in South Africa, in: Anthropos, Vol. 95 
(2001), pp. 99-112. www.africana.ru/biblio/afrocentrism/12_Harnischfeger.htm; 09.03.05. Daniel 
OFFIONG: Secret cults in Nigerian tertiary institutions, Enugu 2003. Amadu SESAY / Charles UKEJE 
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Ihiala Local Government Area, Anambra State, well-known also outside the boundaries 
of Igboland, was revealing. Traditional shrines and their nefast practices were by no 
means the last vestiges of bad governance in Nigeria, as the speaker of the Anambra 
state government wanted to make the Nigerian public believe.32 On the contrary, the 
power which secret cults in Nigeria wield in contemporary life and in regional politics is 
still considerable, and this power has been continuously adapted, from pre-colonial 
times up to present-day political structures of formal multi-party democracy; the Okija-
shrine was only the tip of the iceberg. Many Western educated Nigerians considered the 
continued existence and strength of the country’s traditional and informal social control 
systems as a repulsive contradiction to the country’s quest to become a „modern” state 
with good governance. The words ‘shrine’ or ‘secret cult’ assume quasi-automatically a 
diabolical meaning in the ears of those who advocated good governance and the rule of 
law. But there is strong evidence that Okija and similar secret cults remain very popular 
among Nigerians, honoured and feared at the same time.33 Shrines and cults are not bad 
in themselves, but are symbols of faith for African or Christian religions alike, as Wole 
Soyinka rightly observed in deploring ‘a lazy mental attitude’, ‘simplistic to the point of 
puerility’, among many of those who commented the police raid on the Okija shrine.34 
The question is rather why many Nigerians have no confidence in the contemporary 
formal justice system, inherited from the British colonial masters, and why they would 
rather submit their fate to the crude and cruel approaches of informal justice offered by 
Okija or similar cults, as well as by vigilant groups, such as the Bakassi boys, scattered 
across the country.35 Soyinka offered another perspective in asking what would happen 
if Nigerians, guided by the Okija deity, were to develop the power to take to task their 
selfish and corrupt political leaders? In fact, a similar vision had already been explored 
by the Nobel Laureate in one of his early novels „Season of Anomy” (1973), and in 
principle there is no reason why such a bold vision would be more utopic than the influ-
ence of the Christian Liberation Theology in Latin America.  
However, the example of the Okija-shrine, the representation of the dreaded Ogwugwu 
cult, showed at the same time the harmful alliance between scrupulous entrepreneurs with 
political ambitions, politicians at all levels of regional administration, and cult leaders in 
a society which had for a long time been deprived of traditional checks and balances by 
a ruthless and greedy group of military rulers condoned, if not backed, by global players. 
In spring 2003, during the election campaign for the legislative and gubernatorial elec-
tions of 2003, leading politicians, such as the Governor of Anambra state, Dr. Chris 
Ngige, as well as Senators of the House of Representatives, had apparently been pressed 
by an influential political god-father, the rich entrepreneur Chief Chris Uba, to swear 
                                                                                                                                                
/ Olabisi AINA / Adetanwa ODEBIYI (eds.): „Ethnic Militias And The Future Of Democracy In Ni-
geria”, Obafemi Awolowo University Press, Ile-Ife, Nigeria 2003. 
32 cf. Guardian (Nigeria daily) August 8th, 2004. 
33 Nonso OKEREAFOEZEKE: Foundations of Okija justice. (2004), http://nigeriaworld.com/articles/ 
2005/mar/033.html; 08.03.05. 
34 cf. Wole SOYINKA, Sunday Sun, 19 September 2004, p. 17. 
35 cf. Chichere EKWURIBE: „…In defence of Soyinka.” Sun News, Sunday, 26 September 2004. 
George DANIEL: Soyinka & the Okija shrine. Sun News, 26 September 2004. 
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political allegiance to him before the Okija shrine. Ngige won the elections with the help 
of Uba, but apparently he refused to honour his oath as he was forced to resign and was 
abducted on 10 July 2003. Uba openly boasted with impunity that his former protégé 
won the election only because he had bribed the election authorities (INEC).36.Ngige 
was reinstalled, but in the ensuing battle between supporters of the two adversaries and 
the ongoing quest to dispose the Governor, the latter was subject to assassination at-
tempts and arsons by roving armed bands, allegedly masterminded by Uba and the 
Okija shrine.  
In August 2004, a police raid of the shrine revealed some 80 corpses disposed of in 
the sacred forest of the shrine, several of them mutilated apparently for ritual purposes, 
and ostensibly displayed as a sign of the spiritual and worldly powers of the cult in or-
der to frighten and subdue potential clients. The majority leader of the Anambra State 
House of Assembly, Hon. Humphrey Nsofor, confessed that he and 21 other parliamen-
tarians had also been forced to swear allegiance to Uba under the threat that the cult 
would otherwise perform a spiritual killing. In addition, Nsofor confirmed that these 
spiritual practices had a generation-long tradition within the parallel structures of infor-
mal customary justice and the structures of law enforcement used by the godfathers of 
political leaders to ensure their political power in the state, otherwise „You can’t have 
access to the grassroots, no matter how politically strong you are.”37 The 13 registers of 
clients of the Okija-shrine, confiscated by the Federal Police, comprised some 8,000 
names of Nigerians from virtually all walks of life, including a respectable bishop of 
Rivers State, several members of parliament for Anambra and Rivers states, business-
men, traditional rulers and well-known politicians from all over Nigeria, including La-
gos.38 Ngige and others demanded the publication of the names of the patrons of the 
shrine who belonged to the political and economic elite of the country and who regu-
larly consulted the cult, but the police refused to comply.39 Allegedly, some important 
patrons of the cult, interested in the pursuit of the Ngige case, paid up to five Mio. Naira 
monthly to the Okija shrine to punish the „culprit”, according to the cult’s motto: ‘Ezi-
okwu bu ndu, asi bu onwu’, i.e. ‘truth is life, falsehood (lying) is death’.40 Apparently, 
some of the shrines connected with the Ogwugwu cult, were hijacked by unscrupulous 
young indigenous businessmen in the 1990s to turn it into a money-making machine of 
fraudulent practices, similar to the illicit Advance Fee Fraud or ‘419 scam’.41 Similarly, 
                              
36 cf. US-State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Nigeria, 2004; February 28, 
2005; http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41620.htm; 08.03.05. 
37 cf. Collins EDOMARUSE: Anambra Lawmakers – We swore at Okija Shrine. This Day Sunday, 
16.08.2004. 
38 cf. The Sun, 31.08.04; „Living in Bondage”, cover story, Tell-Magazine, 23 August 2004:12-20; 
„Manhunt for patrons”, cover story of Tell, 6 September, 2004:18-25. 
39 cf. The Sun, 13.08.04; 30.08.04. 
40 cf. Anayo OKOLI / Tony EDIKE: Police uncover 10 fresh shrines, Ohanaeze scribe slams raid. Van-
guard, Lagos, 6 August 2004. 
41 cf. James EZE: „Okija – those who fed fat on the shrine”, Saturday Sun, 14 August 2004. – Igbo 
economic and political history provides other famous examples of similar connections between 
economic, political and ritual interests of unscrupulous leaders, as shown by the revival of the Aro 
Long juju in the early 1920s, later destroyed by the British. This was a mighty and extensive trading 
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vigilante groups, like the infamous Bakassi Boys, cooperated closely with the Okija 
shrine and similar secret cults.42 Preliminary findings of police investigations showed 
that in the past almost all Igbo shrines were involved in ritual killings within the system 
of parallel justice. However, some communities tried to moderate these practices while 
others abused the traditional principles of local deities as „custodians of truth and pro-
tectors of the oppressed” and misused the shrines for their own selfish purposes.43 The 
secretary-General of the pan-Igbo group Ohanaeze, umbrella cultural organisation for 
all Igbos worldwide, the former Biafran military commander, Chief Joe Achuzia, as well 
as independent observers were unanimous in stating that similar shrines exist all over 
Nigeria and they demanded that they all receive the same treatment from the police.44 
2.  Conflict resolution within the realm of the political economy of 
 occult belief systems in Africa becomes increasingly violent 
The processes of modernisation, globalisation and the accompanying transition of Afri-
can societies result in increasingly violent forms of conflict resolution by anti-witchcraft 
movements, for example in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania or South Af-
rica. Apparently, the link between political power and witchcraft is becoming tighter,45 
which is explained by the crucial importance of occult power in the social control of 
violence in Africa. Modern and traditional rulers alike have to understand and speak the 
language of ritual violence if they want to guarantee anything approaching a state-
monopoly of violence.46 Although statistical data on the long-term trends of witchcraft 
related violence in Africa are not available, ‘witchcraft violence’, notably the extra-legal 
killing of alleged witches,47 is on the increase compared with pre- and early colonial 
                                                                                                                                                
network of Aro long distance traders collaborating with local secret cults in contracting humans for 
service to their oracle, but who, in fact, immediately channeled these people into the slave trade as 
cargo; cf. Omoniyi ADEWOYE: The Judicial System in Southern Nigeria, 1854-1954. London 1977. 
Yet another example is the Odozi Obodo Society, a secret society and law-enforcing structure, 
which terrorized Abakaliki in the 1950s and allegedly killed over 400 people in the guise of exact-
ing punishment for their evil deeds cf. Mobolaji E. ALUKO: The barbarous acts of Okija (2004). 
http://www.dawodu.com/aluko93.htlm; 08.03.05. 
42 cf. HARNISCHFEGER: Witchcraft, pp. 29-35. SESAY / UKEJE / AINA / ODEBIYI (eds.): „Ethnic Mili-
tias, pp. 37. 
43 cf. Richard ELESHO / Uba AHAM: „Gory rituals”, The News, Lagos, 23 August, 2004. Victor E. 
DIKE: „Our Belief System And The Deity-Based Shrines”, Lagosforum.com; 07.09.04; at 
<www.lagosforum.com/comment.php?NR=1237>; 08.03.05. 
44 Another example of the political and law-enforcing power of secret cults in Nigeria’s informal sec-
tor is the traditional Ogboni-fraternity of the Yoruba, in South-Western Nigeria (not to be confused 
with the toothless Reformed Ogboni Fraternity; cf. Komolafe KOLAWOLE: African traditional Re-
ligion – Understanding Ogboni Fraternity. Ifa-Orunmila Organisation. Ife 1995. Nathaniel FADIPE: 
The sociology of the Yoruba, Ibadan University Press 1970. Peter MORTON-WILLIAMS: The 
Yoruba Ogboni cult in Oyo, in: Africa (1960), p. 30. Richard Edward DENNETT: The Ogboni and 
other secret societies in Nigeria. Africa Society, London 1916 (reprinted from the Journal of the Af-
rica Society). 
45 GESCHIERE: Modernity, p. 7. 
46 ELLIS / TER HAAR: Worlds of power. 
47 Here and in the following, ‘witchcraft violence’, considers both the emic view of serious harm and 
violence, inflicted by (imaginary or real) witches on innocent citizens, and all forms of violence ap-
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times when less violent forms of punishment for witches (e.g. ransom, enforced migra-
tion etc.) were applied, according to the available ethnographic evidence. The politics of 
anti-witchcraft movements in the impoverished regions of the (former) Northern- and 
Eastern Cape Provinces in South Africa, for example, resulted in the murder of thou-
sands of witches in the 1990s. The death-toll reached hitherto unknown dimensions, for 
example in the former homelands of Lebowa, Gazankulu and Venda, or in the districts 
of Tsolo and Qumbu (Transkei). The impact could be felt not just within the micro-
cosmos of village communities, but also at the meso and macro level of society. Apart 
from the immeasurable harm that „witchcraft violence” inflicted on the individuals and 
families concerned, it also destabilised the social, economic and political set-up of a 
whole region, seriously endangered the state monopoly of force, and undermined the 
legitimacy of the new post-apartheid government. Public as well as civic institutions 
were at pains to stop the violence, but apparently with limited success. The strange col-
lusion between occult belief systems and different trans-local and trans-national social 
networks, embedded in specific transformations of local and global modes of produc-
tion, resulted in unique but reinforcing modifications of witchcraft belief, its underlying 
structures and its impact on the process of democratisation.48  
3.  The modern belief in magic and witchcraft in Africa is characterised 
by an increasing ambivalence of causes, intentions and effects 
The underlying causes of witch-belief, its historical roots, as well as the effects it has 
may differ significantly according to the social strata and modes of production in which 
it is embedded.49 Quite often it has been instrumentalised by conservative and radical 
African leaders alike (e.g. Eyadéma, Moboutu, Kérékou, or liberation movements in 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Zimbabwe etc.) to achieve their goals, for example by 
mystifying exploitation or by eliminating opponents, usually without any regard to the 
disintegrating long-term effects on society. But grass-root liberation movements through-
out Africa have also been seen to use witchcraft accusations as „cults of counter-vio-
lence”50 against political enemies. This often happened under the pretext of combating 
„the relics of feudalism”, as in the politically motivated witch-hunt, either guided by 
                                                                                                                                                
plied against people accused of witchcraft. The former can be at least as fatal as the latter in the 
view of the stakeholders. In any case, most Africans consider witchcraft as an evil, sometimes sa-
tanic force, cf. GESCHIERE: Modernity, pp. 12-5, 215-24. MEYER: Power of money. 
48 KOHNERT: Witchcraft. 
49 cf. Ralph AUSTEN: „The moral economy of witchcraft. An essay in comparative history“, in: Jean 
COMAROFF / John COMAROFF (eds.): Modernity and its Malcontents. Modernity, Ritual and Power 
in Postcolonial Africa, Chicago 1993, pp. 89-110. Edwin ARDENER: „Witchcraft, economics and 
the continuity of belief”, in: Mary DOUGLAS (ed.), „Witchcraft confessions and accusations“, Ta-
vistock, London 1970, pp. 141-60. GESCHIERE: Modernity, pp. 146-151. Monica HUNTER-WILSON: 
„Witch-beliefs and social structure“, in: American J. of Sociology, Vol. 56 (1951), pp. 307-313; re-
printed in: M. MARWICK (ed.): „Witchcraft and sorcery“, Penguin, 1970, pp. 252-263. Dirk 
KOHNERT: On the articulation of witchcraft and modes of production among the Nupe, Northern 
Nigeria. In this volume. 
50 K. B. WILSON: „Cults of violence and counter-violence in Mozambique”, in: Journal of Southern 
African Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1992), pp. 527-582. 
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„Marxist-Leninist” doctrines, as in Benin under the reign of its President Matthieu 
Kérékou (1973-89), or in the fight against apartheid and racism by the „comrades” in 
Gogoza, in the border region of Transkei/Natal in the late 1980s and early 1990s.51 The 
concerned population might even see in these witch-hunters heroes who cleanse their 
areas of evil, rather than view them as evil itself. Thus, under certain historical con-
ditions, witch-hunts constitute what Peter Geschiere52, quoting D. C. Martin, called a 
„popular mode of political action”, directed towards promoting the dawn of a new de-
mocratic order, towards equalizing the distribution of income and wealth, or towards 
defending the ideal of solidarity within acephalous village communities. 
As shown above, scholarly analyses abound on the modernity of witchcraft in Afri-
can societies, stressing its influence on current power relations, politics and develop-
ment. However, one of the puzzling questions still to be solved concerns the ambiguous 
nature of witchcraft, which makes it difficult to predict the impact of occult belief sys-
tems in general, and the impact of witchcraft violence in particular, on politics in Af-
rica.53 This holds particularly true for the intriguing contradiction between the eman-
cipative versus repressive impetus of different anti-witchcraft movements in the stake-
holders’ view, and the significance of this impetus for lasting reconciliation. Much of 
the ambiguity of occult belief systems may be explained by reference to the concept of 
Transnational Social Spaces (TSS54) complemented by an analysis of the articulation 
between witchcraft accusations and the modes of production in which they are embed-
ded. More often than not, the change over time of content and meaning of witchcraft 
accusations appears to go unnoticed, by the population and researchers alike, because its 
outward guise is one of continuity.  
Due to the process of globalisation, the conventional comparative analysis of different 
states, or geographical and social entities, no longer suffices to explain the ‘interlacing 
coherence networks’55, constituting new social facts that emerged outside the unit of 
analysis of national societies or their local representations. Rather than simple compara-
tive studies, simultaneous multi-site research with due regard to trans-local social spaces 
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and religion in South Africa“, OUP, Cape Town 1992, pp. 43-66. 
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55 Norbert ELIAS, quoted in PRIES: Transnational social spaces, p. 3. 
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is required. In fact, this constitutes a basic insight of the TSS concept and the general 
methodological working hypothesis of this paper which should be tested in subsequent 
case studies.56 The profound links between witchcraft and modernity, promoted by 
globalisation, such as the ‘odd complicity’ between occult belief systems in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) and recent transformations of the world market, have already been aptly 
analysed by Geschiere57, the Comaroffs58 and others59. These authors stress the dialecti-
cal interplay between the local and the global as heuristic dimensions of analysis. Nev-
ertheless, either the state or the nation, even in its magic representation as an ‘alien-
nation’ of zombies60, remained a crucial but defective methodological point of reference 
for analysis.61 Certainly, the trans-local dimension of occult belief systems has also been 
noted by various other authors, but they perceived it as a heuristic concept, illuminating 
the linkage of local and global phenomena in its historical setting, rather than one which 
reflects empirical facts.62 Yet, many stakeholders are caught up directly in trans-local 
social networks, which apparently exert an ever-increasing impact on modern structures 
of witchcraft accusations. These different roots of witchcraft violence have had serious 
repercussions on conflict resolution, as has been demonstrated elsewhere.63  
African Renaissance: divided between rationalism and emotion? 
1. Eurocentric approaches constitute a considerable problem 
Since the advent of colonial rule, official approaches, designed to cope with the problems 
of witchcraft violence in Africa, have been based on eurocentric views and colonial ju-
risdiction, legitimised by Western social science. These solutions are inadequate; in fact, 
they constitute part of the problem itself. 
Scholarly interpretation of African belief systems was dominated during colonial rule 
and its aftermath by eurocentric prejudices, oscillating between paternalistic homage of 
the natives’ „primitive” mode of thought and its ethical devaluation by the colonial po-
                              
56 KOHNERT: On the articulation of witchcraft. PRIES: Transnational social spaces. 
57 GESCHIERE: Modernity. 
58 COMAROFF / COMAROFF: Occult economies. 
59 It goes without saying that ‘modern’ witchcraft accusations are often rooted in the colonial or even 
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62 cf. COMAROFF / COMAROFF: Occult economies, p. 294. 
63 KOHNERT: Witchcraft. 
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licy under the pretext of the moral education of the natives.64 Guided by an ideology of 
modernisation, formal institutions (such as the Christian churches and missionaries) and 
the (post) colonial state treated African belief in witchcraft as superstition which would 
be most probably eradicated by the process of modernisation by itself in the long run. In 
the mean time the judiciary enacted anti-witchcraft laws which stipulated that both 
witchcraft and the accusation of witchcraft were punishable according to the law, 
thereby effectively preventing colonial courts from taking an active part in resolving the 
witchcraft fears of their subjects.65 The present jurisdiction in most African countries is 
still based on these biased colonial anti-witchcraft laws.  
Under these conditions, in view of the apparent illegitimacy of state intervention along 
the lines of Western reasoning, the stakeholders sought help in the informal sector. That 
is, they were left on their own, and subsequently often engaged in self-justice. This con-
tributed to a rapid erosion of the state’s monopoly on force, which seriously affected the 
legitimacy of public institutions. Even traditional authorities, formerly considered to be 
the guardians of customary law, are now at pains to cope with the situation because of 
considerable changes in the incidence, content, and form of witchcraft accusations over 
time, and the compromising attitude of traditional authorities during the apartheid re-
gime. African independent and Pentecostal churches, mushrooming all over Africa, as 
well as „modern” witch-finders, such as leaders of politically motivated ANC-youth 
organisations, have emphatically offered to cater more effectively for the felt needs of 
the people than have either the state or traditional leaders. But it is open to question 
whether institutions or personalities belonging to the informal sector are always likely to 
act in the best interests of society. 
In post-apartheid South Africa, for example, government, political parties, and trade 
unions alike, were under increasing pressure to take account of witchcraft beliefs, not 
only in order to prevent further loss of lives and property, but in order to combat the loss 
of their legitimacy as well. However, in actual practice, the stakeholders differed widely 
on how to deal with witchcraft. In September 1998 the National Conference on Witch-
craft Violence, organised by the Commission of Gender Equality (CGE) in the Northern 
Province, pushed government further to change its attitude towards witchcraft. Repre-
sentatives of the CGE conceded an urgent need to develop new strategies which should 
not simply deny the existence of witchcraft, especially since this approach has utterly 
failed to work in the past. Besides educational and legal tasks, namely educational pro-
grammes and the revision of the anti-witchcraft act, the experts favoured among other 
things, spiritual alternatives, substitution of witchcraft violence by spiritual healing, and 
„activities to treat the communities’ psychosocial needs”.66 According to a problem 
analysis by representatives of the South African Human Rights Commission (HRC), the 
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„belief in witchcraft has the capacity to paralyse people”, consequently witchcraft vio-
lence was seen as „a sign of a pathology in a community”. Representatives of the De-
partment of Constitutional Development declared witchcraft violence as „the number-
one enemy of our society”, and the Department of Justice deplored among other things 
its „negative effects on the economy of the country“.67 
However, in the past, neither the state nor liberation movements, political parties, or 
trade unions seemed to have cared very much about witchcraft. Only if social and po-
litical conflict boiled over to a veritable witch craze, was it deemed necessary to take 
notice officially. There is a growing awareness that current legislation such as the anti 
witchcraft legislation in Nigeria, Cameroon or South Africa, which still reflects colonial 
reasoning, is unable to cope with the problem.68 By its salomonic phrasing it punishes 
both the alleged witch and the allegedly bewitched, i.e. those who express their fear by 
witchcraft accusations.69 It thus protects the real culprits, at least from the perspective of 
people believing in the existence of witchcraft. Therefore, the South African state, for 
example, has been challenged by both independent bodies and political parties such as 
the ANC, to „review the legal system from being euro-centric to reflecting the reality of 
a multicultural nation“.70 The Commission of Gender Equality (CGE), the Department 
of Justice, and the Law Commission of South Africa set up a committee to draw up pro-
posals for a new law. In February 2000 it presented parliament with a first draft of the 
„Regulation of Baloyi Practices Act“71; however, apparently there has so far been no 
follow-up to these initiatives.72 The call of grassroot organisations, politicians and aca-
demics for an indigenisation of national laws and regulations, i.e. their adaptation to the 
African socio-cultural setting in general, and the official recognition of the existence of 
witchcraft in particular, are certainly justified, but only in as far as basic human rights 
are respected. Any attempt at a „domestication“ of witchcraft violence by an opportunist 
indigenisation of legislation, based on the official recognition of witchcraft and of the 
accusers, e.g. traditional healers (sangomas, in South Africa) as plaintiffs, without due 
regard to universal concepts of human rights, is hardly to be considered as sustainable. 
                              
67 Ibid., p. 55. 
68 cf. GESCHIERE: Modernity, pp. 169-72, 185-197. HARNISCHFEGER: Witchcraft. J. HUND: African 
witchcraft and western law – psychological and cultural issues, in: J. of Contemporary Religion, 
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70 CGE, p. 55. 
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72 HUND: African witchcraft. 
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It could perhaps help the state to regain credibility and legitimacy in the short run, but it 
may even promote the witch craze, accentuate social cleavages or lead to despotism of 
charismatic rulers in the long run. 
2. On the doubtful impact of African ethno-philosophy 
African ethno-philosophers opposed both colonialism and basic concepts of Western 
social science by propagating the return to the roots of an authentic African culture. This 
provoked among other things a re-evaluation of African religions, including occult belief 
systems, which were seen as real and effective, but essentially defensive and utilitaristic.  
Representatives of African ethno-philosophy, such as Placide Tempels, Alexis Ka-
game, and the Senegalese President Léopold Sédar Senghor (1906-2001), successfully 
opposed colonial rule and strengthened African identity. This holds particularly true for 
the concept of Négritude, as developed by Aimé Césaire of Martinique and Senghor, 
particularly in francophone Africa. Négritude was defined as comprising the totality of 
cultural values of the Black world, but the concept was nevertheless based on European 
cultural tradition, particularly of French intellectual origin.73 It embraced nostalgic glo-
rifications of the African philosophical tradition and the alleged harmony of African 
life. According to its advocates, there was a fundamental difference in philosophical 
thinking between Africans, who underlined their collective identity, „I feel (the other), 
… therefore I am”74, and the identity of Europeans, based on the Descartian imperative 
of the separation of body and mind: „Cogito ergo sum; I think, therefore I am.“75 
Nevertheless, the proponents of Négritude maintained that Africans were not less ra-
tional than Europeans. However, according to Senghor, the African’s reason is not dis-
cursive but synthetic, not antagonistic, but sympathetic. In short, it is another mode of 
knowledge. Reason does not impoverish the things, it does not grind them up in rigid 
schemes. The African is less interested in the appearance of an object than in its pro-
found reality, i.e. in its sense. „The European reason is analytic through utilisation, the 
reason of Negroes is intuitive through participation.”76  
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danse l'Autre, donc je suis.' Or, danser c'est créer, surtout lorsque la danse est danse d'amour. C'est, 
en tout cas, le meilleur mode de connaissance». Leopold Sédar SENGHOR: Liberté I, négritude et 
humanisme, Ed. du Seuil, 1964, p. 259. Italics by Senghor. 
75 SENGHOR, ibid. In short: «L'émotion est nègre, la raison est hellène.» (emotion is Negro, reason is 
Hellenistic); cf. http://www.kirjasto.sci.fi/senghor.htm; 15.03.05. 
76 SENGHOR: Liberté I, p. 203. 
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The ethno-philosophy of Négritude has had important repercussions on the interpre-
tation of African religion and occult belief systems. Magic was seen by Senghor at the 
crossroads of the rational and the mystical, but nevertheless belonging to the realm of 
science: white magic, as an important means of defence against all sorts of misfortune; 
black magic, notably witchcraft, as an offensive weapon, which, however, was not pe-
culiar to Africa. In both forms, magic was seen as strictly utilitaristic and individual.77 
However, for the Africans concerned this victory had ambiguous effects. In imple-
menting their vision of Négritude the new African rulers may have reinforced the self-
consciousness and the collective identity of their people. But at the same time, the collu-
sion of African ethno-philosophers and elites served the continued suppression of their 
subjects under the pretext of an African renaissance. Therefore, other African philoso-
phers and sociologists highly critical of ethno-philosophy, such as Paulin J. Hountondji, 
sharply criticised both ethno-philosophy and the malevolent facets of globalised capital-
ism in Africa (cf. above). For them, ethno-philosophy only interpreted African realities 
differently, without contributing to its necessary transformations, treating it as an invari-
able ontological bond instead of a historical process. For Hountondji, African philosophy 
is an activity, a process that expresses and transcends itself, rather than a fixed system 
of truth, although it is inseparable from African science, the strength of which lies in its 
hypothetical nature and in the strive for knowledge and wisdom, since as with any sci-
ence, there is no absolute truth in scientific research.78 As far as the belief in witchcraft 
is concerned, indigenous African knowledge, used effectively by traditional healers to 
answer problems caused by witchcraft, showed the limits of Cartesian rationalism. The 
latter was qualified as a „reductionist approach, reducing and impoverishing the recog-
nition of reality.”79 Hountondji called for the resistance of African cultures against 
globalisation as the only way to guarantee self-determination and sustainable develop-
ment with a human and African face: „For Africans, there are two forms of losing one's 
way: by immurement in particularism, or dispersion in the universal“.80 
                              
77 «La magie … n’est pas propre au Négro-africain. Elle n’est, en somme, qu’un recours contre 
l’anormal et, à ce titre, elle se trouve partout, même en Europe, chez le peuple. Pourtant il est inté-
ressant de l’étudier, car l’accident est fréquent en Afrique noire, que la magie se situe au croise-
ment du rationnel et du mystique. … Il est question d’une technique, d’une science. …Voilà la reli-
gion des Négro-africains dont Delafosse disait: ‘Ces peuples, dont on a parfois nié qu’ils eussent 
une religion, sont, en réalité, parmi les plus religieux de la terre. Les préoccupations d’ordre divin 
l’emportent chez eux, le plus souvent, sur les préoccupations d’ordre purement humain’. … La ma-
gie entre dans le cadre de la religion négro-africaine en tant qu’elle est défensive, c’est à dire s’il 
s’agit de se protéger contre des actes de magie comme de tout malheur. … Et, en effet, sous sa 
forme offensive, la plus caractéristique (la sorcellerie, D. K.), la magie n’est pas proprement négro-
africaine. … C’est que la magie, même sous sa forme défensive, a un but strictement utilitaire et 
individuel». SENGHOR: Liberté I, pp. 72-74; italics by Senghor. 
78 cf. HOUNTONDJI: African Philosophy. IDEM. (ed.): Les savoirs endogènes – pistes pour une re-
cherché, Paris 1994. D. A. MASOLO: African philosophy in search of identity, Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington 1994, p. 199-203. 
79 cf. HOUNTONDJI: Les savoirs endogène, p. 23-27. Comlan Th ADJIDO: La médicine psychosoma-
tique dans se rapports avec la sorcellerie, in: HOUNTONDJI: Les savoirs endogène, p. 247-256. 
HOUNTONDJI: African Cultures and Globalisation. 
80 Quoted by HOUNTONDJI: „African Cultures and Globalisation, p. 24, with reference to one of the 
founding fathers of the Négritude, Aimé CÉSAIRE: Aimé Césaire in a letter to Maurice Thorez, 1956. 
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In the same vein, Ali A. Mazrui called for a qualified modernisation, i.e. for a devel-
opment that is based on modernisation without dependency. Indigenisation of material 
and social resources, above all the use of African languages, of domestication, diversifi-
cation, regional integration and counter-penetration, was seen as a strategy for promot-
ing sustainable self-reliance.81 
3. Evans-Pritchard´s fallacy 
The Cartesian credo of the separation of body and mind, of emotion and reason, is to 
date the base for scholarly discussions of African belief in witchcraft. Generations of 
anthropologists since Evans-Pritchard (1937) have been at pains to prove that the Western 
logic of cause and effect is perfectly compatible with African magic reasoning. How-
ever, this credo reflects only half of the truth, as body and mind are intimately linked 
together, which makes rational action without strong emotions impossible. The com-
bined effects of Descarte’s error82 and Evans-Pritchard’s fallacy lead to unfeasible ra-
tionalistic propositions for solutions concerning the eradication of witchcraft violence. 
In general, Western educated experts, European and African alike, consider witch-
craft basically as an „illogic and mistaken belief” which should be eradicated as soon as 
possible through education and critical assessment.83 As stated by Wyatt MacGaffey in 
the preface to Geschiere’s (1997) reader, African systems of occult belief are anything 
but „irrational”, as was demonstrated in 1937 by Evans-Pritchard’s classical study of the 
Azande. Although its inherent logic can hardly be grasped in patterns of thought of 
natural science, its methodological structure is no less rational than the impulse-giving 
ethics of the Protestant spirit of capitalism in 19th century Europe, and Geschiere (1997) 
points out astonishing parallels between powerful African „marabouts“ and the role at-
tributed to public relations experts in current American politics. The relevant distinction 
in this respect is that each adheres to a different rationality with different degrees of con-
cern for values such as equality, solidarity, achievement and development orientation. In 
short, methodologically, the difference between the rationality of African witchcraft be-
liefs and Western forms of reasoning lies more in the degree of its „reduction of com-
plexity”, to borrow an expression from Niklas Luhman, than in the degree of rationality.84 
                              
81 „… development is modernization minus dependency. But what is modernization? One possible 
answer is that modernization is change which is compatible with the present stage of human know-
ledge, which seeks to comprehend the legacy of the past, which is sensitive to the needs of the future, 
and which is increasingly aware of its global context. This is the positive interpretation of moderniza-
tion. Skills and values are at the core. … Where does culture enter into this? If development equals 
modernization minus dependency, there is not doubt about the relevance of the African Renaissance 
in at least that part of the equation which concerns ‘minus dependence’. African culture is central to 
this process of reducing dependency in the dialectic of modernization. One strategy of transcending 
dependency is indigenization, which includes greater utilization of indigenous techniques, person-
nel, and approaches to purposeful change”: cf. MAZRUI: The African Renaissance, pp. 3-11. 
82 Antonio DAMASIO: „Descartes' Error. Emotion, reason and the human brain“, New York 1994 (Dt. 
„Descartes Irrtum. Fühlen, Denken und das menschliche Gehirn“, Stuttgart, 1997. Quotiation ac-
cording to German edition). 
83 CGE, pp. 49, 53. 
84 „Zande belief in witchcraft in no way contradicts empirical knowledge of cause and effect. The 
world known to the senses is just as real to them as it is to us ... They are foreshortening the chain 
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Although Evans-Pritchard85 was right in confronting common Western prejudices of 
the 1920s on primitive African thinking with the intrinsic logic of the belief in magic 
and witchcraft, this was just half of the truth. Evans-Pritchard's fallacy consisted in his 
focus on the rationality of occult belief systems, which deflected attention from its deci-
sive role as an emotional base for survival. This fallacy may be illustrated in analogy to 
the results of research in neuro-physiology as developed by Antonio Damasio86 some 
ten years ago. Evans-Pritchard, and with him much of conventional economic anthro-
pology, was probably wrong in underestimating the profound structural links between 
emotion and rational reasoning in human beings in general. Rational behaviour is at 
least as much influenced by deep seated emotions as by empirical knowledge. In fact, 
man can not act rationally without moving emotions. In contrast to the Cartesian postu-
late on the fundamental separation of body and soul (cogito, ergo sum), human decision 
making, by its very biological structure, is never determined by rational reasoning 
alone, but guided by emotions grown on, and deeply embedded in, the respective culture 
of the actor.87 One may even go one step further in discussing the relevance of Gerald 
Edelman’s88 hypothesis that the biological self, or at least vital parts of the human brain, 
have been conditioned and structured in the course of human genesis by basic values 
needed for survival. Thus, the evolution of mankind provided for the acceptance of ba-
sic human value-systems which guide its actions; Edelman´s thesis possibly even sheds 
new light on the controversy concerning the existence of universal human rights. Ac-
cording to neuro-physiological theories on cognition, the perception of the world in the 
human brain has been directed through the filter of positive and negative sentiments 
from the very moment of birth onwards. There exists a close neuro-biological link be-
tween feeling and thinking, which makes the existence of emotions (based on the re-
spective socio-cultural setting) a precondition for any rational action of both Africans 
and Europeans. But even more important in this context, the linkage of ratio and emo-
tions, born out of and developed within specific socio-cultural settings,89 is of immediate 
relevance for the resolution of the pressing social and political problems mentioned 
above, such as education or the propensity to violent mob actions against witches.  
Rational action without deep emotions is impossible, because the lack of these emo-
tions deprives the mind of a vital driving force and measure gauge which enables the 
actor to choose an adequate action from a universe of different options. This argument 
can by no means be reduced to the age-old debate on value judgements in social science. 
The underlying vision of Cartesian rationality as a remedy for major ills of development 
was in itself a fallacy. Some three centuries ago, Francisco Goya chastised a similar form 
                                                                                                                                                
of events, and in a particular social situation are selecting the cause that is socially relevant and ne-
glecting the rest” Edward EVANS-PRITCHARD: Witchcraft, oracles and magic among the Azande, 
1937, p. 73. Reprinted: Oxford, 1963. (Thus) „witchcraft explains why events are harmful to man 
and not how they happen. A Zande perceives how they happen just as we do” (ibid., p. 72). 
85 EVANS-PRITCHARD: Witchcraft, pp. 21-39,63-83,99-106. 
86 DAMASIO: „Descartes' Error. 
87 DAMASIO: Descartes' Error, pp. 325-328. 
88 Gerald M. EDELMAN: „Bright air, brilliant fire - On the matter of the mind“, New York 1992, pp. 
232-236. 
89 DAMASIO: Descartes' Error, p. 327. 
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of hubris in his famous Capricho „The dream 
[sleep] of reason produces monsters”.90 
These fundamental emotional guidelines 
of every human being are not only rooted in 
the general biological history of mankind but 
to at least as great an extent in the specific 
socio-cultural setting responsible for the 
education and upkeep of any rational actor 
from birth. Because they are embedded in 
the respective cultures, these emotions are 
not easily exchangeable, and one would de-
prive Africans believing in witchcraft of the 
necessary means of survival if one were to 
try to eradicate this belief without providing 
similar strong and sustainable emotional al-
ternatives. 
Now, occult belief systems, like religions in 
general, induce not just a certain vision of 
the world and of human relations, but they 
also provide, as shown above, for strong 
emotions. This relates not just to individual 
hate, fear, or other emotions directly linked 
to witchcraft, but to the whole fabric of the
Fig. 1: „The dream [sleep] of reason produces 
monsters“. Francisco Goya, 1797. 
human emotional system, as indicated above. The state, NGOs or other progressive insti-
tutions of civil society would literally deprive the concerned of their ability to survive 
if they were to categorically deny them their belief in magic and witchcraft without pro-
viding, jointly within the framework of educational programmes and a gradual scientific 
dismantling of witchcraft belief (as advocated by the CGE and other institutions), a 
convincing source of equally strong alternative „development-enhancing” emotions. No 
wonder that most education programmes which concentrated on rational reasoning, 
whether implemented by missionaries, schools or the state, have utterly failed since the 
beginning of colonial rule. 
If it are specific culturally determined manners of reducing complexity, and not diffe-
rent rationalities which constitute the major distinction between African magic and 
Western rational reasoning, then generations of social anthropologists since Evans-
Pritchard have been right in stressing (apparently without much effect) that Western edu-
cated scientists, experts, and politicians should be especially careful not to cultivate the 
hubris of rationality in their dialogue with African stakeholders. „Irrational behaviour” 
due to methodologically unsound reduction of complexity is common in Western so-
                              
90 Francisco GOYA: „El sueño de la razón produce monstrous” (1797), in English, „The dream [sleep] 
of reason produces monsters”, which derives its ambiguity from two antagonistic interpretations, 
arising from the fact that the Spanish word sueño means „sleep” as well as „dream”. For a descrip-
tion of the image cf. website: www.museum.cornell.edu/HFJ/handbook/hb128.html, 10.03.05. 
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cieties, too.91 Thus, I revert to the central theme of my argument: the open society and 
its enemies, to borrow a phrase from Karl R. Popper, the Nestor of neo-positivist phi-
losophy. The given socio-cultural setting and social structure have become the corner-
stones of the Western delimitation of objectivity and rationality, just as the denunciation 
of persons as witches by their fellow citizens depends finally, at least according to the 
classical interpretation of African witchcraft by Evans-Pritchard (as quoted above), on 
the social recognition of certain worldviews on cause and effect. 
4. African religion provides crucial answers to current problems 
African religious systems provided a framework for valuable indigenous solutions to 
current problems of contemporary life, including the problem of witchcraft violence. 
Besides this, they might, under certain conditions, provide the outside world with an 
inspiring new dimension of philosophic thought and emancipative action, for example, 
within the realm of conflict resolution and reconciliation. However, even in the case of 
the ‘domestication’ of witchcraft violence, this holds only in so far as appropriate Afri-
can answers can be shielded against the negative impact of globalised capitalism. 
The concept, methods and lessons learned for example from the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)92, later on copied by other African states like 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone or Ghana, might be highly relevant, not just for fellow Africans, 
but also for conflict solving cultures of industrialised countries.93 Deliberative processes 
of truth and reconciliation in politics, as organised by the TRC, could, in transforming a 
plurality of people into a community, make our hopes and opinions at the same time 
ethical and rational. Public and attentive discussion of individual truth with respect to 
violent conflicts opens up the chance to create ethical knowledge and shared ethical 
                              
91 In order to avoid ethnocentric misconceptions I want to stress again that many aspects of occult 
belief systems and their rationality are not restricted to African countries. Even in the USA, the be-
lief in witchcraft was officially recognised as a religion in 1982 by the High Court, under the term 
Wicca. The latter, as contemporary anti-witchcraft cults in Africa, is far from being a traditionally-
minded belief system. It propagates its objectives with the help of modern concepts and technology, 
and even has its own website. The revival of occult belief systems around the world has different, 
hitherto unexplored sources which call for comparative in-depth investigations by ongoing re-
search. The obsession with isolating and fixing the „true” ideas and emotions of human beings by 
technical investigation must, however, inevitably fail, as it is based on a methodological fallacy. 
Our conception of both human nature and scientific objectivity in general can not be isolated and 
fixed by science once and for all, as both depend on the unremitting evolution of knowledge, the 
possibility of mutual exchange and critique, and last but not least, on actual social conventions and 
social structures encouraging or averting critical reflection of our present knowledge. The latter is 
decisive in setting the limits between legitimate critical discourse on the one hand, and dogmatic 
pursuit of „enemies to society” or witch-hunts on the other. 
92 T. MALULEKE: ’Can lions and rabbits reconcile? The South African TRC as an instrument for 
peace-building’, in: The Ecumenical Review, Vol. 53, Nr. 2 (2001), pp. 190-201. P. J. CAMPBELL: 
‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC): human rights and state transitions: the South 
African model’, in: African Studies Quarterly, Vol. 4, Nr. 3 (2000), pp. 1-30. 
93 cf. Philippe-Joseph SALAZAR / Sanya OSHA / Wim VAN BINSBERGEN (eds.): Truth in politics – 
rethorical approaches to democratic deliberation in Africa and beyond. Leiden, African Studies 
Centre (from: Quest – An African Journal of Philosophy, 16.2002,1/2; special issue; published in 
March 2004); cf. intergral text: <www.quest-journal.net/2002.htm>; 02.03.05. 
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truth.94 Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with the general im-
plications of this thesis in more detail. In the following, I would like to focus on the so-
cietal problems caused by occult belief systems, and especially on witchcraft violence. 
In May 2000 the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) began 
its hearings on politically motivated witchcraft violence in Northern Province. ANC 
supporters, convicted in 1990 and serving long-term sentences for their attacks, applied 
for amnesty with respect to the murder of 26 villagers in the former Bantustan of Venda 
between 1989 and 1993. The applicants claimed they perceived their victims as persons 
who were practising witchcraft and who, in doing so were collaborating with traditional 
chiefs and politicians of the hated „homeland” government of Venda in order to 
strengthen their position. The TRC finally granted amnesty to 33 applicants in June 
2000, ten others were refused amnesty. In summary, reconciliation in Northern Province 
proved to be difficult, but not impossible.  
The official post-apartheid vision of the reality of witchcraft represented an important 
shift in the public discourse on witchcraft.95 The massive and hitherto unimaginable in-
volvement of the state, trans-local and even trans-national social, political and academic 
networks in a local discourse on witchcraft, driven by an understanding attitude vis-à-
vis the stakeholders concerned (unlike early colonial administration and missionaries), 
and the weakness of counteracting vested interests of other implicated groups, opened 
new chances for conflict resolution. Beside the impact of trans-local forces on conflict 
resolution, such as the Commission of Gender Equality (CGE), it was probably facili-
tated by the relatively strong inward orientation of the population: characterised firstly 
by the remarkable absence of strong migrant, civic or underground informal political 
organisations, and secondly, by the low key profile, if not absence, of trans-local social 
networks who wanted to profit from the violence, the strong backing of witch-hunts by 
the co-villagers, and the corresponding legitimacy the persecutors had in the emic view.  
In contrast, the different nature of trans-local networks and modes of production fuel-
ling the hotbed of violence in the Transkei96, put local reconciliation efforts at risk right 
from the beginning. Witchcraft related violence, although not open visible, was consid-
erable here, as in the Northern Province, but it did not draw the same sympathetic atten-
tion of external actors like the CGE, as in Northern Province. Therefore, the „case” of 
Tsolo and Qumbu was handled by the post-apartheid authorities with the conventional 
means which most democratic governments used to handle outbreaks of domestic vio-
lence in disfavoured regions: i.e. policing, awareness campaigns and development pro-
grammes, as usual hampered by the constraints of inadequate resources and ineffective 
projects. Yet, it would be misleading to excuse the lack of interest in the violence, par-
                              
94 Eugene GARVER: Truth in politics – Ethical argument, ethical knowledge, and ethical truth, in: 
SALAZAR / OSHA / VAN BINSBERGEN (eds.), Truth in politics, pp. 220-237. 
95 Isac A. NIEHAUS: ‘Witchcraft in the new South Africa: from colonial superstition to postcolonial 
reality?’, in H. L. MOORE / T. SANDERS (eds.), Magical Interpretations, Material Realities: moder-
nity, witchcraft and the occult in postcolonial Africa, London 2002, pp. 184-205, here pp. 184f., 
199.  
96 KOHNERT: Witchcraft. 
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ticularly in its occult dimension, merely by ignorance. Last but not least because of its 
sensitive political nature, the conflict was obscured by a longstanding „culture of silence 
and untruth”97, comparable only with what was apparently a politically motivated dis-
guise of the aftermath of the conflicts in KwaZulu Natal in the 1990s by the post-
apartheid regime. Neglected by the outside world, the villagers decided in May 1999 to 
take matters in their own hands in order to achieve peace and reconciliation. Trusting in 
their own local culture, in which public confession of the truth behind the aggression 
was considered to be the ultimate condition of any conflict resolution, they, in fact, ap-
plied similar principles to the TRC on the national level, but unfortunately with different 
results. The outside interference of conflicting political forces (e.g. ANC, South African 
Communist party and the ultra right Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), rival trade 
unions in the mines, and other trans-local networks with vested interests (e.g. a „Third 
World Mafia” trading in drugs and weapons), by no means congruent with the legiti-
mate interests of the local community, and of a quite different nature from those in-
volved in Northern Province, proved to be too strong to be handled by the villagers 
alone. They had to tackle unknown forces, the involvement of ‘modern’ elements of 
globalised markets of violence, brought to their villages by way of integration into new 
trans-national social spaces propelled by the forces of globalisation in general, and the 
transition process of the apartheid regime in particular. Once this Pandora’s box had 
been opened, there was apparently no way out that the villagers themselves could have 
made use of. 
                              
97 J. B. PEIRES: Secrecy and violence in rural Tsolo. Unpublished paper, read at the South African 
Historical Association Conference, Univ. of Western Cape, July 1999, p. 1f. 
